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Abstract 
The article examines two ‘postmodern’ critiques of modernity: a general history which 
argues that it was never solely Western, and a work of Latin American cultural criticism 
which wishes to leave a modernity seen as eurocentric.  It argues that to understand the 
modern elements of Latin America entails keeping present the European, and in part 
pre-nineteenth-century, genealogy of modernity.  This, in order to grasp both the pitfalls 
of claiming modernity is a common project (colonialism vanishes) and the difficulty of 
going beyond it (European modernity bequeathed the language of breaks and dialectical 
incorporations).  The piece identifies the rhetorical choreography involved when the 
limits of the critique of Western modernity become apparent. 
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The critique of modernity did not begin in the last two decades.  Rousseau (Pocock 
1987: 56), Weber (1989) and, perhaps above all for a generation of Latin American cultural 
critics who began work in the 1960s, Adorno and Horkheimer (1997) on the instrumental 
rationality of capitalist modernity are important earlier voices.  However, in and beyond 
Latin America the critique has been renewed in recent years with the focus not first and 
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foremost on modernity’s capitalist character but on its westernness.  The critique is a pincer 
movement.  From one direction comes the charge that modernity never was just Western in 
its origins, but rather was a ‘common’ project.  I shall take C. A. Bayly’s (2004) The Birth of 
the Modern World 1780-1914, which enjoys a strained relationship with the Spanish- and 
Portuguese-speaking world, as an example of this argument.  In accordance with a classical 
rubric, modern habits, even if they do not belong exclusively to the West, emerge in Bayly’s 
narrative as a progressive force.  Modernity is a good thing.  A long nineteenth-century good 
thing.  From the other angle comes the thrust more common among contemporary critics of 
Latin American culture, namely, that modernity was, or leastways became, a Eurocentric, 
Western affair.  I shall digress through various first-generation practitioners of Latin 
American cultural studies, but will take as my primary example of this tendency Néstor 
García Canclini’s (2001) Culturas híbridas.  In that text, a modernity again closely identified 
with the nineteenth century presents a largely negative face, provoking not only the 
denunciation of its Eurocentrism but the desire to supersede it altogether (hence the book’s 
subtitle: Estrategias para entrar y salir de la modernidad). 
There have been much more acerbic critiques of modernity in Latin America post-
Culturas híbridas.  The broad aim of such critiques is precisely not to rehearse the detail of a 
canonical European modernity, but instead to illuminate its eclipsed colonial periphery 
(Dussel, 1998); decouple from it, or leastways think it ‘otherwise’ (Mignolo, 2005; Escobar, 
2007); activate the West’s own discarded, because politically unsuitable, philosophical 
fragments, the ‘South of the North’, so to speak (Santos, 2009); or examine that emancipatory 
‘historical reason’, still present in Latin America, capable of resisting the dominant, 
instrumental reason of Europe and the USA (Quijano, 1993).  A full and considered 
engagement with the above writings, which would begin by considering the European — 
Franco-German — genealogy of the discourse of ‘otherwise’, is for another occasion.  
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Suffice it to say that I choose Culturas híbridas because in trying to answer the question that 
later works will address (how does Latin America get out of modernity?), it takes the time to 
trace the lineaments of a nineteenth-century, Weberian understanding of what modernity 
might be.  In so doing, it both exhibits a degree of respect for the latter’s internal 
complexities while, like Bayly, proceeding with its ostensibly postmodern, anti-ethnocentric 
critique.   
Alan Knight (2007: 97) argues that the shape that modernity assumes in Latin 
America is not determined by modernity’s European origins and ‘does not warrant it carrying 
a permanent “made in Europe” stamp’.  While not perhaps sharing his contention that the 
concept of modernity has been subject to a ‘hostile takeover’ by the ‘asset-strippers of lit crit 
and cultural studies’ (107), I share his view that, at least in its philosophical guise, ‘it is 
historically a reasonable label to use, since it captures the idea of something new, a decisive 
break with the past, and a repudiation of tradition (i.e., the inherited ideas and institutions of 
the old regime)’ (100).  My argument will be two-pronged.  First, and this is perhaps the 
lesser of the two points, the effort to name the nineteenth century as the proper place for 
modernity needs careful scrutiny.  Such an effort has history on its side.  Knight (101) 
observes that modernity as philosophical creature is born with the European Enlightenment.  
However, it is worth remembering that when Hegel coined the name ‘the modern age’, he did 
not believe that the age in question had begun in 1789, but that it had older origins which had 
reached a particular fulfillment with the French Revolution.  My second point is that the idea 
of a break with tradition and the past, an idea that comes from a specific place able to direct 
the material manifestations of this novelty on a global scale as never before (cf. Quijano 140), 
is exactly what warrants the label carrying an indelible ‘made in Europe’ stamp.  Knight 
(109-110; my emphasis): ‘Citizenship, equality before the law, and free expression, though 
often infringed or denied, are today indelible features of Latin America that trace back to 
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Enlightenment origins’.  Latin Americanists may want the region to have its own modernity, 
and yet...  I reproduce in that last, adversative phrase an oft-deployed rhetorical strategy 
which consists in arguing passionately that the region had its own idiosyncratic modernity, 
before either conceding that the latter may not have been entirely its own or stumbling into 
contradictions that betray as much.  The contents of the modern age were not all made in 
Europe and modern critical reason is not entirely Western (for it to be so, the West would 
have had to invent reason itself); and yet to ignore the historical imprint of modernity is to 
misunderstand its sheer invasiveness. 
Despite its singular name, ‘modernity’ has conventionally been defined in two 
conflicting, but not unrelated, ways: modernity as historical phase or socioeconomic reality 
and modernity as aesthetic concept (Calinescu, 1987: 41).  Hegel versus Baudelaire.  These 
competing definitions resurface in C. A. Bayly’s book.  There,  modernity is an ‘aspiration to 
be “up with the times”’, a ‘process of emulation and borrowing’, but also a historical period, 
‘a period which began at the end of the eighteenth century and has continued up to the 
present day in various forms’ (Bayly, 2004: 11): 
It seems difficult to deny that, between about 1780 and 1914, increasing 
numbers of people decided that they were modern, or that they were living in a 
modern world, whether they liked it or not.  The Scottish and French 
philosophers of the eighteenth century believed that a good deal of all previous 
human thought could safely be dumped.  By the end of the nineteenth century, 
icons of technical modernization — the car, the aeroplane, the telephone — 
were all around to dramatize this sensibility.  By 1900, many elite Asians and 
Africans had similarly come to believe that this was an age when custom, 
tradition, patriarchy, old styles of religion, and community were eroding and 
should erode further. (10) 
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Some important scholars (Cassirer, 1963: 10; Calinescu, 1987: 13-14; Hall and Gieben, 1997; 
Arendt, 1993: 27; Habermas, 1994: 5) would blanch at the notion that the European modern 
age ‘began’ at the end of the eighteenth century.  But even if his periodisation looks like a 
land-grab which not only seizes modernity for historians of the nineteenth century, but makes 
it easier to argue that it is a shared, as opposed to Western, phenomenon, Bayly is conscious 
that not all the things he lists as the contents of modernity are ‘born’ in the nineteenth 
century; rather, they achieve a certain generalisation throughout the society of the  time. 
In fact, the check-list Bayly (11) produces for this nineteenth-century condition (the 
rise of ‘the nation-state, demanding centralisation of power or loyalty to an ethnic solidarity, 
alongside a massive expansion of global commercial and intellectual links.  The international 
spread of industrialisation and a new style of urban living’) corresponds to an ideal European 
modernity whose status as archetype he will spend the rest of the book trying to disqualify.  
Such a disqualification will not be easy.  Each and every negation of the name simultaneously 
reaffirms it.  Even to insist that the canonical contents of European modernity (capitalism, the 
nation-state, a rational world-view, the Subject) were precisely features of a European 
trajectory, and that other countries took ‘very different roads to modernization’ (Touraine, 
1995: 11), is to posit as singular, because one has used the same name (modernization), the 
very thing whose singularity one rejects.  The insistence on multiple paths, and on the varied 
contents of different modernisations, cannot hide the fact that all these roads appear to wind 
up at the same place, that is, at modernisation (‘the vast majority of countries in the world 
took very different roads to modernization’).  This definitional aporia has particular 
significance for the anti-ethnocentric critique of modernity.  For the road to the analysis of 
the respective roads to modernisation passes by way of a series of related European 
languages and traditions, and by way of one language and tradition in particular.  
Modernisation, modernity, modernité and modernidad all point back to the late fifth-century 
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AD Latin word modernus, meaning ‘now’ or ‘the time of the now’ (Calinescu, 1987: 14 and 
Jameson, 2002: 17), a word given renewed currency around the end of the eighteenth century, 
and specifically in Hegel, as a polemical means to suggest that parts of Europe had ushered in 
a new age (Habermas, 1994: 83).  In short, it is impossible to disentangle from the word 
modernidad the European sense of modernity as novelty or break with tradition and the past.  
This is what unites the two conflicting interpretations of modernity.  And it is this linguistic 
and conceptual tie to the European tradition that renders problematic efforts to disavow the 
centrality of Europe to the modern age. 
Néstor García Canclini is not the first Latin American to write about modernity. A 
certain Latin American tradition of writing on modernity would include: Domingo Sarmiento, 
of course, but also his Chilean contemporary, Francisco Bilbao (2007), on the shiny ‘new 
age’ that comes out of Europe with the French Revolution; José Enrique Rodó’s more critical 
perspective on the materialism of the modern USA; the nationalism of José Martí and the 
Marxism of José Carlos Mariátegui; and the Octavio Paz of Los hijos del limo, one of the 
seminal aphoristic articulations — in effect, of Calinescu’s aesthetic concept of modernity — 
on modernity as perpetually renewed criticism and change (Sharman 2006: 8-9 and 102-103).  
Subsequently, Latin American cultural criticism of the 1960s becomes particularly critical of 
modernity.  First, because of the tendency of what is called the philosophical discourse of 
modernity to segregate and stratify people and things on the basis of their quotient of 
‘modernness’.  ‘Modernity’ operates as a qualitative as much as a chronological category.  
Modernity, say its advocates, is better than the period of (European) history which preceded it 
(Eisenstadt, 1983: 231-232); or, indeed, superior to the contemporary reality of other parts of 
the globe, which might be simultaneous with it but which are adjudged to be ‘behind’ it (see 
Osborne, 1992: 75).  Secondly, on account of the wave of US-inspired socioeconomic 
modernisation which swept across Latin America principally after the Second World War, a 
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passively received ‘failed or deficient “modernization”’ (Quijano, 1993: 141), in the eyes of 
many Left intellectuals, which merely led to a state of dependency.  For both reasons, the 
actually existing strains of the modern found in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s are 
viewed negatively, as a dominant or neo-colonial force.  However, there is an important 
difference between these revolutionary dismantlings of ‘imperialist’ or ‘neo-colonialist’ 
modernity that were nonetheless keen to make good on some of the original contents of the 
modern European project, and other, post-Glasnost work on the question of modernity in 
Latin America, such as that of García Canclini, in which the modern cultural project as a 
whole appears to come under attack. 
García Canclini’s definition of modernity in Culturas híbridas begins on a 
Habermasian note by restating the standard acceptation of it as a historical phase (‘la 
modernidad como etapa histórica’ [40]).  However, by the end of the book it has become a 
‘condition’ (‘una condición que nos envuelve’) (322); and, somewhere en route, four 
‘projects’: 
Por proyecto emancipador entendemos la secularización de los campos 
culturales, la producción autoexpresiva y autorregulada de las prácticas 
simbólicas, su desenvolvimiento en mercados autónomos.  Forman parte de 
este movimiento emancipador la racionalización de la vida social y el 
individualismo creciente, sobre todo en las grandes ciudades. 
Denominamos proyecto expansivo a la tendencia de la modernidad que 
busca extender el conocimiento y la posesión de la naturaleza, la producción, 
la circulación y el consumo de los bienes.  En el capitalismo, la expansión está 
motivada preferentemente por el incremento del lucro; pero en un sentido más 
amplio se manifiesta en la promoción de los descubrimientos científicos y el 
desarrollo industrial. 
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El proyecto renovador abarca dos aspectos, con frecuencia 
complementarios: por una parte, la persecución de un mejoramiento e 
innovación incesantes propios de una relación con la naturaleza y la sociedad 
liberada de toda prescripción sagrada sobre cómo debe ser el mundo; por la 
otra, la necesidad de reformular una y otra vez los signos de distinción que el 
consumo masificado desgasta. 
Llamamos proyecto democratizador al movimiento de la modernidad 
que confía en la educación, la difusión del arte y los saberes especializados, 
para lograr una evolución racional y moral.  Se extiende desde la ilustración 
hasta la UNESCO, desde el positivismo hasta los programas educativos o de 
popularización de la ciencia y la cultura emprendidos por gobiernos liberales, 
socialistas y agrupaciones alternativas e independientes. (51)  
Here modernity is presented as a taxonomy from which historical causality is removed 
(nowhere does it say what brought about such ‘projects’).  The result of this taxonomic 
approach is to infer that there might be more than one road to modernity (although even here 
there is a species of blueprint and thus prescriptiveness is not altogether avoided).  
Rationalisation plays a role, but is not the sole cause; capitalism rears its head, but is one 
possibility among others; the nation-state is mentioned, but only metonymically, in the shape 
of ‘liberal governments’.  García Canclini’s contention is that cultural modernity in Europe 
came about in socioeconomically unmodernised places; and thus that it makes no sense to 
compare Latin American cultural modernity melancholically to the European blueprint of a 
full and harmonious cultural modernity that never actually existed in the so-called modern 
heartlands.  Aside from the fact that the contents of modernity are described variously as 
positive and negative, and thus that the intellectual and moral judgement on it is a complex 
one, the other essential point of García Canclini’s commentary-definition, which I have 
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insisted on at greater length elsewhere (Sharman 2006), is that the equivocal evaluation of the 
projects of modernity does not alter the fact that the projects define part, rather than the 
whole, of the historical phase called the modern age.  Not everything in the modern age is 
modern (Latour, 1993: 68).  This caveat will assume its significance in due course, when we 
witness attempts to demonstrate that Western modernity borrowed things from elsewhere, 
and was thus not the sole originator of modernity, whereas in fact the things in question were 
borrowed during the historical phase called modernity but were not themselves modern. 
In what concerns periodisation, García Canclini and other contributors to the debate 
on Latin American cultural modernity of the same time are close to the years (1890-1914) 
that Bayly regards as the ‘crucible of modernity’.  This periodisation coincides with Marshall 
Berman’s (1983) third phase of what is essentially a European-Anglo-American affair.  The 
exact dates may be contested, but what Beatriz Sarlo, García Canclini, Jesús Martín-Barbero 
(1998: 150ff) and José Joaquín Brunner (1992: 59) tacitly agree on is that Latin America’s 
variant of modernity is closely wedded to the second industrial revolution.  For Sarlo, 
modernity only really arrives in Buenos Aires in the early decades of the twentieth century 
(Sarlo, 1988; 1992; 1993; and 2000: 109-110).  García Canclini (2001: 95) and Brunner 
(1992: 71) go further.  They claim that cultural modernity only takes hold in Latin America in 
the 1950s, principally through schooling and television.  For Brunner, what might be 
considered elements of modernity, such as Sarmiento, the modernistas, aspects of the 
Mexican Revolution, the ideas of Martí and Mariátegui, and early-twentieth-century 
university reform, are all isolated ‘new’ (not ‘modern’) moments which do not amount to a 
genuine ‘constelación de cultura propiamente moderna como tal’ (50-51). 
Brunner’s aggressively modernist narrative of Latin American modernity has the 
virtue of being able to identify the date by which certain modern habits have achieved a 
generalisation throughout the region, but the dual vices of downplaying the spread and 
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significance of modern ideas and practices in the earlier period (we recall Thomson) and of 
overstating the propriety of that constellation of modern Latin American culture, which, even 
in the 1950s, was in practice ‘contaminated’ at every step by tradition.  In contrast, both 
Bayly and García Canclini insist that there were abundant residual traditional forms in 
modern societies, even in the ‘original’ heartlands of modernity: hence Bayly’s chapters on 
‘Empires of Religion’ and ‘The Reconstitution of Social Hierarchies’, and García Canclini’s 
different ‘historical temporalities’.  Not everything in the modern age is modern.  And not all 
the ‘modern’ contents of modernity begin in the modern age, a fact evidenced by Bayly’s 
point that the tradition of civic republicanism can be traced back to Renaissance Italy and, 
indeed, classical times.   
I have so far touched on just one of the main criticisms of that Western modernity 
outlined by Bayly and García Canclini, which consists in telling it that it never was especially 
modern.  The second way of puncturing Western modernity’s self-image is to tell it that 
someone else invented it.  While Bayly and García Canclini are at one in stressing the many 
premodern contents of the historical period known as modernity, Bayly differs from García 
Canclini and Calinescu on the question of origins.  For Calinescu (1987: 41) — and this is the 
standard definition — socioeconomic modernity necessarily refers to a ‘stage in the history of 
Western civilization’.  Cassirer, Habermas, Arendt and Berman, but also García Canclini, 
Sarlo and Martín-Barbero, may dispute the precise temporal beginnings of modernity, but not 
the fact that the name designates a phase of Western history.  At this juncture, it is important 
to recall Calinescu’s other meaning of modernity, that is, modernity as concept, attitude or 
condition.  For as soon as the word modernity is applied to non-Western parts of the globe, it 
cannot mean ‘a stage in the history of Western civilization’.  It would make no sense to say 
that a stage or phase of European history had arrived in Peru.  Historical phases do not arrive 
elsewhere; elements of a historical phase arrive elsewhere.  To speak of the ‘modernity’ of 
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Peru is to abstract and generalise the word (to speak of the modernity of Manchester is to do 
likewise; there is no ‘proper’, non-abstract use of the word).  This is Habermas’s (1994: 2) 
point about the part played by 1950s’ sociological functionalism: namely, that its theory of 
modernisation performs an abstraction on the (Weberian) concept of modernity, dissociating 
the latter from its modern European origins and stylising it into a ‘spatio-temporally neutral 
model for processes of social development in general’.  In short, and in this view, places 
beyond modern Europe get fragments, pale versions, hand-me-downs even, of the European 
project: the original (Modernity) is ‘stylised’ and finds its copies (modernisations) 
transplanted into alien contexts.   
Aníbal Quijano (1993: 141) argues something similar: Latin America finds itself not 
only without a modernity to speak of, but, by virtue of the region’s failure to industrialise, 
saddled with a deficient modernisation to boot.  However, there are significant differences 
between Habermas and Quijano.  Whereas Habermas maintains that Europe continues to 
encourage both modernisation and the emancipatory project of modernity, Quijano holds that 
Europe (he writes specifically about ‘England’) puts paid to the liberating tendencies of 
modernity (i.e. historical reason), English hegemony ushering in instead the new age of 
modernisation by instrumentalising reason (we are back with Adorno and Horkheimer).  
Somewhat enigmatically, for Quijano it is Latin America, and above all its non-European 
populations, that will carry the torch of historical reason — a flame that comes from 
indigenous and modern European sources alike —, since, and this is a further difference from 
Habermas, Latin America was in on the original project of modernity from the beginning. 
 Leaving aside the (romantic) antinomies of the schema proposed by Quijano (Europe 
modernised and lost its modernity; Latin America modernised badly but held onto its 
modernity), he comes close, with one important difference, to the central proposition of 
Bayly’s book: not only were there subsequently different modernities, it is an error to 
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concede that the first modernity was ever simply Western in origin.  Latin American 
modernity is not, then, a general condition extrapolated from a phase of Western civilisation.  
This is a proposition with which Quijano and Dussel can happily concur.  However, Bayly is 
not thinking of their, sixteenth-century modernity.  His anti-diffusionist argument is that, 
notwithstanding the undeniable growing economic dominance of the West, peoples beyond 
Western Europe and North America were actively engaged in making the modern world in 
the nineteenth century, and it represents the most servile submission to the image of the West 
as the Essential Protagonist of World History to claim otherwise, a view echoed by some 
Latin Americanists (Thurner, 2003: 29-30).  Bayly’s general historiography has, nevertheless, 
attracted criticism from historians of Spanish America, not because they think he has got his 
dates wrong, nor because they consider his thesis incorrect, but, contra Dussel and Quijano, 
because he downplays the role of the Hispanic world in the birth of the modern, thereby 
perpetuating the view of a backward Spain dragging behind it a clutch of no less retrograde 
former colonies.  Guy Thomson (2007) has shown that recognisably ‘modern’ political and 
cultural habits could be found in the period from the 1850s to the 1880s in relatively rural 
parts both of the provinces of Córdoba, Málaga and Granada in southern Spain and of the 
Puebla Sierra of East-Central Mexico.  However, the upshot of this particular critique of 
Bayly is that his thesis receives greater confirmation: even Spain and Spanish America (yes, 
even they) exhibit clearly modern habits, and thus modernity is even more of a shared 
enterprise than we thought. 
 Bayly’s would-be anti-ethnocentric approach characteristically has two aspects: the 
question of origins and the question of appropriation.  The weaker aspect, the question of 
appropriation, has become a critical commonplace: it insists that Western ideas were taken 
up, reworked and transformed elsewhere.  This is Bayly’s point about the Asian response to 
the modern state: yes, it was European expansion which stimulated the rapid development of 
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modern state forms in Asia, but some areas already had a sophisticated bureaucracy or public 
authority beyond a particular dynasty, and likewise possessed the ability to borrow European 
forms.  Such an argument acknowledges pre-existing non-Western structures; suggests that 
non-Western populations were not inert victim-receptacles into which Western liquid was 
poured; and contends that some of the diffused liquid washed back, altered, onto Western 
shores and thus changed the original mixture.  Nevertheless, and for all its recasting of a 
certain view of non-Western peoples as hapless imitators of the West, to speak of 
appropriation is still to speak of reception rather than production at source and does not sink 
the diffusion metaphor (the idea that modernity is diffused from its European and, later, 
North American centres).  All that happens, following diffusion, is that non-European 
peoples ‘set limits to the nature and extent of their domination by European power-holders’ 
(Bayly, 2004: 3).  That is a modest claim. 
The stronger aspect, the question of origins, holds that non-Western parts of the globe 
were the originators, not just the adapters, of some of the palpably modern contents of the 
modern world.  One must proceed carefully here.  A simple list of the many things borrowed 
by modern Europeans would not suffice to prove that such borrowings were modern nor, 
hence, demonstrate the existence of an entirely non-European modernity.  ‘Herbal medical 
remedies developed by indigenous peoples in Africa and South America’ may have been 
‘borrowed and adapted by Europeans in the eighteenth century’ (Bayly, 2004: 77), but such 
remedies were precisely traditional and thus contributed to the period without themselves 
being modern contents of modernity. In contrast, the classic example cited by Bayly to prove 
that the modern contents of modernity were not only made in the West is Japanese 
industrialisation.  The conventional narrative of modernity is that it was driven economically 
by the industrial revolution and that the latter was born in England.  Bayly (2004: 12) 
suggests that Japanese industrialisation ran pari passu with it: that the Meiji regime (1868-
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1912) shows a non-Western country plainly giving birth to modern contents of modernity, 
and in a manner that does not conform to the Western blueprint (the country had a markedly 
traditional social order and no representative government), such that one ought to speak 
rather of  a ‘common modernity’.    
Bayly is trying to dislocate the image of a West which, before 1500, believed God to 
be the originator of the universe, and which, after 1500, believed itself to be the creator of the 
modern world.  The proper name ‘Western modernity’ attempts to capture for the West all 
things considered modern, when the reality is that, first, Europe and, then, the US begged, 
borrowed and stole things from elsewhere (‘techniques of dyeing and glazing from Asia […] 
were still being borrowed and adapted by Europeans in the eighteenth century’ [Bayly, 2004: 
77]).  Bayly’s recognition of non-Western things and actors in the modern age renders the 
name ‘Western modernity’ improper and may well persuade us of the need to speak instead, 
with or without piety, of an ‘alternative’, or even a ‘common’, modernity.  And yet...  There 
is something too reassuring about this notion of a do-it-yourself modernity: 
Everyone knows the formula by now: this means that there can be a modernity 
which is different from the standard or hegemonic Anglo-Saxon model.  
Whatever you dislike about the latter, including the subaltern position it leaves 
you in, can be effaced by the reassuring and ‘cultural’ notion that you can 
fashion your own modernity differently, so that there can be a Latin-American 
kind, or an Indian kind or an African kind, and so forth. […]  But this is to 
overlook the other fundamental meaning of modernity which is that of a 
worldwide capitalism itself.  The standardization projected by capitalist 
globalization in this third or late stage of the system casts considerable doubt 
on all these pious hopes for cultural variety in a future world colonized by a 
universal market order. (Jameson, 2002:12-13) 
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One wonders whether Japan was not rather an instance of appropriation.  As Bayly says, the 
Meiji regime constantly sent missions to the West to learn the latest military and industrial 
techniques, the better to outflank the West.  The upshot of this case-study is the first 
illustration in Bayly’s book: the nineteenth-century Japanese print depicting the Japanese 
woman in Western dress seated at a Singer sewing machine.  The image appears to confirm 
the conventional, rather than Bayly’s, view: namely, that for ‘uniformity’ read 
‘westernisation’.  While the Western dress does not annul the Japaneseness of the woman in 
print, the Westernness of her would-be Japanese modernity is inscribed on her body. 
This is even more so in the case of the Latin America.  It has become an article of 
faith to insist, for instance, that the contribution of Latin American science to modernity be 
given its proper dues.  One finds this insistence in someone like Quijano (1993: 143) but also 
in Whitaker’s (1963) classic volume on enlightenment in the region.  Saldaña (2006: 16) 
claims that Latin American science such as New Granada botany, Mexican herbalism, 
colonial Peruvian mathematics, and New Spanish metallurgy was at various moments central 
to European science.  Elías Trabulse’s (1985: 41-44) exhaustive reconstruction of the Creole 
and indigenous Latin American scientific tradition leads him to argue that European 
observations on botany, zoology, geology, hydrology and geography gleaned from the New 
World almost always included reports on Indian scientific advances, and that such things as 
nahua medicinal plant remedies were used extensively in Europe.  Tellingly, however, he 
goes on to concede that while indigenous medicine may well have been as effective as the 
still essentially late-medieval European medicine of the day, in truth this was because both 
were equally poor, or, as Quevedo and Gutiérrez (2006: 163) see it, both would fail to pass 
muster once the new European anatomical and clinical medicine was introduced in the first 
part of the nineteenth century.  In other words, the point would seem to be that the modern 
science that takes place in Latin America is profoundly shaped by the European tradition, 
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above all by an intermediary such as Feijoo (Saldaña: 126), and carried out by the 
descendants of Europeans; and thus that to rush hastily, with Bayly, to an unquestioning use 
of the word common is to risking masking the Western and, indeed, imperial-colonial 
dimension of modernity.  In this imperial-colonial dimension (which is not the only 
dimension) it is the West which manages most to shape modernity, and to occupy the 
common ground, not to say the common land — both of which henceforth cease to be 
common.  But then Bayly knows this.  The dominant rhetorical form of The Birth of the 
Modern World is the adversative: bold anti-ethnocentric proposition followed by ‘however’, 
‘That said’, ‘All the same’ or ‘and yet’ (Bayly, 2004: 20, 79, 81, 290 and 318).  
This rhetorical strategy emerges early in the book with Bayly’s treatment of Jan de 
Vries’s idea of demand-side ‘industrious revolutions’.  If the conventional idea of the 
industrial revolution posits certain European countries as the prime movers of modernity, the 
concept of industrious revolution points to the phenomenon in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries whereby family labour was used more efficiently by buying in goods and services 
from outside the household.  Once it is realised that industrious revolutions ‘could increase 
prosperity in a much stealthier way without benefit of a rapid ratcheting up of industrial 
production’ (2004: 52), Bayly can argue that Western and non-Western people were 
simultaneously engaged in a new commercial dynamic which had more to do with changing 
socioeconomic patterns in many parts of the globe than with a Big Change in just one.  For 
our purposes, parts of the valley of Mexico and coastal Brazil now appear on the radar as 
places which contributed a new dynamic to the expansion of commerce and, hence, of 
modernity itself.  However, by the beginning of the fourth of the six pages Bayly dedicates to 
the notion, the ostensible objective of highlighting the non-European dimension of modernity 
gives way to a concession explaining instead why these non-European industrious revolutions 
amounted to little, before Bayly then moves to explain, in a section entitled ‘Trade, Finance, 
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and Innovation: European Competitive Advantages’, why Europe is after all the driving force 
of the modern world.  Despite advancing the idea of a common modernity, Bayly (2004: 168) 
lists the multiple factors which ensured that, from the middle of the nineteenth century, ‘the 
flow of events was now more firmly from Europe and North America outward’.  These 
factors include: usable land, agriculture, food availability, coal, inventions, stable legal and 
financial institutions, the commercial middle classes, the public sphere, and military 
capability (above all see 60-64). 
Of even greater significance than this concession to Europe and North America’s 
domination of the modern world from the middle of the nineteenth century is that regarding 
the historical primacy of the West in the ‘shift to modernity’.  The following sentences appear 
to petition for  a ‘common modernity’, but buried in their midst are the key concessions ‘The 
shift to modernity certainly occurred somewhat earlier’ and ‘For a time the West was both an 
exemplar and a controller of modernity’: 
The shift to modernity certainly occurred somewhat earlier, and initially much 
more powerfully in western Europe and its North American colonies.  Before 
1914, people in most parts of the world were grappling in many different ways 
with this common modernity and were not simply imitators of the West.  For a 
time the West was both an exemplar and a controller of modernity.  By the 
mid-nineteenth century, there were many new controllers and exemplars 
around the world, among which Japan’s partially self-fashioned modernity was 
the most important. (Bayly, 2004: 12) 
The concessions on chronology are crucial.  For one can only advance the idea of a common 
modernity by focusing on the nineteenth century, that is, by beginning the story too late.  By 
that time, the West has already named and put its indelible stamp on the modern age, 
something to which Bayly is not oblivious.  In addition to the factors listed above, he sees 
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certain things that are not ‘common’ but rather unique to the West, the ‘most significant’ 
being the European idea of progress in knowledge and the material rewards to be had from it 
(the second being the triumvirate of liberalism, socialism and science).  In the final analysis, 
Bayly (2004: 80) restates a commonly-held view (see Roberts, 1997: 610), which undermines 
his claim to have written a new history of the birth of the modern world, according to which 
‘It is probably […] in the intellectual buoyancy of the European idea of the advance of 
knowledge and its material rewards, rather than any practical application of any particular 
technology as such, that we must seek the most significant difference’. 
If this attitude to knowledge and the world is found throughout a significant part of 
the European social body by the nineteenth century, this is in part because it represents the 
generalisation of the older, techno-scientific and philosophical idea of modernity as the 
passage from an age of revelation understood as the discovery of that which was already 
there, to an age of invention understood as the production of something new. The history of 
the genesis of its contours, which includes the experimental-observational method in science, 
the mathematisation of nature and the discovery of universal laws, is conventionally reduced 
to a series of metonyms (Galileo, Bruno, Bacon, Descartes, Newton) and the philosophical 
idea of modernity as production thought to stabilise roughly, ‘perhaps’, somewhere between 
Descartes and Leibniz in the seventeenth century (Derrida, 1987: 42).  Pocock (1987: 52) 
cautions that the ‘new philosophy’ was in certain respects conservative (‘a successful 
reduction of metaphysics and enthusiasm within the bounds set by experimentalism and 
empiricism’), and it is undeniable that  the experimental-experiential attitude, which is not the 
exclusive work of Europeans (Roberts [1997: 327] singles out the importance of Arab 
knowledge in the opening up of the Middle Ages), has a dominating-rationalising drive that 
will produce  Taylorism.  However, at a determinate historical moment in European history, 
and in opposition to a very specific tradition, a strain of the modern attitude was radical in a 
 19 
way that few things since have been.  For a Spinoza combatting theocratic power, 
‘modernity’ meant criticism and challenge, experience and experiment in the face of the 
‘divinely ordained system of aristocracy, monarchy, land-ownership, and ecclesiastical 
authority’ which held near-absolute sway in the West until 1650 (Israel, 2001:3-4).  The 
interesting point for our purpose is that much of this work of what Quijano would call 
historical reason is carried out before Bayly’s start-date of the 1780s.  One thinks of the work 
on natural law of Grotius, Pufendorf, Locke and Hutcheson, and of the challenge to a 
murderous Christian orthodoxy in somewhere like Scotland around the late 1600s (Herman, 
2002);  a modern attitude, moreover, which appears to have been produced largely in Europe, 
or by descendants of Europe, where the shift from personal ties to market relationships, and 
from a corporate vision of society to an individualist one, was well advanced in the United 
Provinces and Great Britain as early as 1700  (Roberts, 1997: 543).  
As a consequence, I venture the following proposition: that wherever it is a question 
of modernity, we would do well, while remaining sceptical of its periodising tendencies, not 
to forget the older, techno-scientific and philosophical understanding that is the ‘new 
philosophy’.  The irony of this is that the earlier moments of this earlier modernity prove 
Bayly’s point better.  I do not mean that all we have to do is go back to Carlos de Sigüenza y 
Góngora’s challenge to the Aristotelian view of comets in Mexico in 1680, or to José de 
Aguilar on Cartesianism in Peru in 1701, or  to José Eusebio Llano Zapata’s work on nature 
in Peru in the 1750s.  I take it that all these invaluable contributions to a Latin American 
intellectual context dominated by the Inquisition are made by individuals — Creoles, Jesuits 
— steeped in a would-be ‘universal’ thought that yet has a pronounced European inflection.  I 
mean, rather, that we would have to go back a little further.  It is probably the case that, 
thanks largely to the ‘transmission function’ of Arab culture, and in particular to the Arab 
science and mathematics that would underpin the calculations of modernity (Roberts, 1997: 
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327-330 and 519-520), much of which entered Europe through the portal of Spain, early 
modernity was more non-Western than the late one; it is certainly the case that for Bayly to 
begin his narrative in the 1780s is to begin too late.  By the time of the long nineteenth 
century, the modern contributions to the modern world made by non-European peoples have 
a certain European air about them.  The attractions of the word common are understandable, 
since gravity and aerodynamics are universal, not European, principles, and one would not 
want to make the mistake of saying that modern science or, worse still, modern reason are 
wholly European (an astonishing piece of totalising logic which presupposes that there was 
neither science nor reason before modern Europe applied its mind to the matter).  However,  
if a proper name like ‘European modernity’ hides both the non-European input into and the 
‘universal’ contents of modernity, and thus requires scrutiny, the notion of a ‘common 
modernity’ requires even more careful qualification and risks underestimating  both European 
inventiveness (just how many of the modern contents of modernity were franked in Europe) 
and Western invasiveness (the fact that vast tracts of the globe find that ‘the times’ they want 
to be ‘up with’ are Western in far-reaching ways).    
García Canclini affirms the need to stop melancholically comparing the way in which 
modernity ‘enters’ Latin America to an idealised (though illusory) ‘original’ European 
trajectory.  Let us speak, then, of an exclusively Latin American modernity.  And yet…  The 
European matrix of modernity is precisely invasive, and comparativism impossible to avoid.  
The history of European colonialism, and the philosophemes of modern Europe, are 
embedded in the name Latin American modernity. This is the legacy of the modern West — 
though not just of the modern West, since the European element of the juridico-theologico-
political culture of post-independence Latin America is not exclusively modern .  This legacy 
is passively accepted by some; by others it is transformed, resignified and resisted, as Bayly 
(2004: 307) remarks.  And it could be no other way.  If Europe was the first organising centre 
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of modernity, and if certain European languages are closely bound up with the possibility of 
thinking modernity in general, Europe is not identical with modernity,since modern science 
or modern reason in general always exceed any particular, even central, instance of the 
general, and non-Europeans can perfectly well do modern science or use modern reason.  
Because Europe never could completely centre the modern world-system, and because its 
highly successful attempts to universalise its thought do not amount to a universalism, the 
European centre ends up being displaced in importance by its colonial periphery.  
Nevertheless, in its new contexts modernity does not altogether shed its history; and among 
the ‘many new controllers and exemplars’ of modernity its European or Western imprint is 
not lost.  Unless one preserves the critical memory of this appellation, one utterly fails to 
grasp the nature and reach of colonialism.  
The nineteenth-century discourse of progress peddled by the region’s positivists must 
remain problematic for Latin America, especially when it witnesses the emancipatory 
possibilities of modernity blocked from entering the materiality of society (Quijano 144), and 
ends up instead with a crude modernisation.  One understands why Culturas híbridas 
petitions for a violent overcoming of both the discourse and historical phase of nineteenth-
century modernity.  What has been less noticed in that book is García Canclini’s (2001: 322) 
unwillingness to abandon the armoury of modern concepts.  There is a stubborn residue in 
that text reluctant to conclude that the displacement of the categories of modernity should 
amount to their simple abandonment.  Besides, there could be no more modern gesture: 
modernity dreams of the guillotine, in the wake of which the old order and concepts fall 
bloodily into the basket.  On the contrary, to think the birth of the modern world, for which 
there is no greater ‘crucible’ than Latin America before and during the nineteenth century, 
cannot but involve the nineteenth-century trio of liberalism, socialism and science.  But it 
must also involve going beyond Bayly’s and Berman’s and García Canclini’s and Sarlo’s 
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preoccupation with the nineteenth century, to the older ‘Nueva Filosofía’, with its impulse 
towards experience and experiment, criticism and change.  It then becomes possible to think 
modernity positively and negatively at the same time: to think the critique of dogmatic 
tradition alongside the triumphalist assertion of European superiority; or the gains of a 
common law, common schooling and universal rights against the abuse of universality and 
the common ground. 
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